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Who's in Charge of U.S. Indian Policy?

Congress and the Supreme Court at
Loggerheads Over American Indian Religious
Freedom

by David Wilkins, Ph.D.
Our interest in Indian self-government today is not the interest of sentimentalists or antiquarians.
We have a vital concern with Indian self-government because the Indian is to America what the
Jew was to the Russian Czars and Hitler's Germany. For us, the Indian tribe is the miner's canary
and when it flutters and droops we know that the poison gasses of intolerance threaten all other

minorities in our land. And who of us is not a member of some minority? (Cohen, 1949:313-314).
A prophet is not respected in his own country (John 4: 44).

Introduction
The federal government's three branches--executive, legislative, judicial, and that unwieldy mass known
simply as "the bureaucracy" have, during the last half-decade--1987-1991--produced a dizzying crop of laws,
policies, proclamations, regulations, and court decisions which have served simultaneously to 1) reaffirm
tribal sovereignty; 2) permit and encourage greater state interference within Indian Country; 3) enhance
federal legislative authority over tribes; and 4) deny constitutional free-exercise religious protections both to
individual Indians and to tribes.
On the legislative side, Congress has established the experimental Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration
Project (102 St. 2285, 2296; as amended 105 St. 1278) which is a major step towards restoring the tribal right
of self-determination, and is discussing the potentiality of reestablishing a more constitutionally-grounded
policy with tribes--"New Federalism." This policy would resemble the bilateral agreement period between

tribes and the U.S. which lasted from 1875 to 1914 (Senate Report, No. 101-216, 1989:16; see S.2512 "New
Federalism for American Indian Act, April 25, 1990).
These legislative developments and policy discussions were preceded by two 1987 congressional resolu-

tions, one joint, the other a Senate concurrent resolution, which reaffirmed the political nature of the
tribal-federal relationship. First, Public Law 10-67 (101 St. 386), a joint resolution commemorating the
bicentennial of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, enacted July 10,1987, reaffirmed the Northwest Ordinance
as one of the fundamental legal documents of the United States.
The original legislation, the articles of which were to "forever remain unalterable, unless by common
consent" (1 St. 50 52) provided civil government for the Northwest Territory, and also included a declaration
by the federal government and its people to "democratic principles, religious freedom, and individual rights"

(101 St. 386). More importantly, the Ordinance enunciated the fundamental political premise--consent-upon which subsequent federal Indian policy was to be based:
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The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and property
shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty,
they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress;
but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs
being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them... (1 St. 50, 52).
Ivo months after this establishment of policy, on September 16,1987, Senator Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii),
along with eighteen others introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 76 which acknowledged 1) the Iroquois

Confederacy and other tribes' democratic traditesions played in the formation of the
U.S. Constitution; 2) the "government-to-government" relationship between tribes and the federal govern-

ment; 3) the federal government's continuing legal obligations to tribal nations in the areas of health,
education, economic assistance, and cultural identity; and finally a statement reaffirming the recently
commemorated Northwest Ordinance provision on the federal government's need to exercise the "utmost
good faith" in upholding its treaties with tribal nations.
The year 1987 was also interesting because it signalled the start (it was a two-year study) of yet another
(42 preceded this one) congressional investigation (Senate Report, 101-216,1989: 236-238) of the corruption,

fraud, incompetence, and mismanagement lacing the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and other federal
agencies that deal with tribes and individual Indians in several areas--economic development and Indian
preference contracting, Indian child sexual abuse, Indian natural resource issues, Indian health, Indian
housing, and tribal elite corruption. (The Senate's investigation will be discussedSenate's investigation will be discussed in more detail later in this

article.)

Not surprisingly, the Special Committee on Investigations, co-chaired by Arizona's own sometimes
beleaguered senatorial delegation, Messrs. DeConcini and McCain of the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs, which conducted the study, was not directed as part of their congressional mandate to investigate the
impact of decisions handed down by their sister institution, the Supreme Court. The three branches of the
federal government historically, though not always consistently, have operated from a similar set of intellectual, political, and cultural premises when it comes to developing, implementing, and evaluating programs
and policies for America's indigenous peoples. This is not at all unusual considering that the three branches
constitute the ruling national coalition of American plcoalition of American politics. And the Supreme Court, like other political

institutions, as Dahl noted, "is a member of such ruling coalitions, and as such its decisions are typically
supportive of the policies emerging from other political institutions" (1957: 293).
In addition, and even more intriguing, the Special Committee did not feel called to ascertain the impact
of various supreme court opinions on tribal rights largely because the judicial branch had not yet explicitly
embarked on its imperialistic quest to disregard the rights of tribes and their citizens in several areas of law:

non-member Indian criminal jurisdiction (Duro v. Reina, 58 USLW 4643 (1990)), double taxation (Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 57 USLW 4445 (1989)), zoning regulations of Indian land (Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima, 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989)), and most significantly, the free exercise of
religion (Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Employment
Division v. Sith, 108 L.Ed 2d. 876 (1990)). On the contrary, the contrary, the Court in 1987 handed down two opinions

which were generally supportive of tribal rights regarding the expansive parameters of tribal court jurisdiction

(Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1986)) and the right of tribal governments to regulate
gaming in Indian country free from state and local government interference (Califoria v. Cabazon, 55 USLW

4225 (1987)).
Nineteen eighty-eight, however, signalled the advent of the political branches (Congress and Executive)1
and the judicial branch heading in radically divergent directions in the several areas of law mentioned above,
but most dangerously in the sensitive area of religious freedom for Indians. In Lyng the Supreme Court in a
majority opinion held that the constitution's free exercise clause did not prevent tgovernmental destruction
of the most sacred sites of three small tribes in northern California. The majority made this ruling in full
realization that the activity of the U.S. Forest Service--construction of a six-mile road--would virtually destroy
the Indian's ability to practice their religion.
Also, in April 1988, and just eight days after Lyng, the Supreme Court in Employmnent Division v. Smith

(485 U.S. 660--also known as Smith I) granted certiorari and then remanded the case back to the Oregon
Supreme Court for a determination as to whether the Oregon statute criminalizing peyote provided an
exception for religious use. The Court suggested that "if Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote,
and if that prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution, there is no federal right to engage in that

conduct in Oregon" (p. 672).
41
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Conversely, one day after Smith I, on April 28,1988, Congress enacted a Comprehensive Elementary and
Secondary education law (102 St. 130), which contained a provision of largely symbolic significance: 'The
Congress," it was declared, "hereby repudiates and rejects House Concurrent Resolution 108 of the 83rd
Congress and any policy of unilateral termination of federal relations with any Indian nation." The essence
of unilateral termination, an aberrant and short-lived federal policy, was gutted in 1958 when Secretary of
Interior Fred A. Seaton stated that termination acts would not be enacted without the full consent of the

Indians concerned (quoted in Prucha, 1990: 240-241). It was later verbally discredited by Presidents Nixon
in 1970 and Reagan in 1983 in their Indian policy statements. It had not, however, been officially rejected by
the body which had created it.
Besides the belated expulsion of the termination resolution, the year witnessed amendments to several
existing laws (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 101 St. 1788; Indian Housing Act, 102 St. 676; Education
Amendments Act, 102 St. 1603; Indian Financing Act, 102 St. 1763; Indian Self-Determination Amendments,

102 St. 2285; Indian Reorganization Act Amendments, 102 St. 2938; Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation and
Amendments Act, 102 St. 3929; and Indian Health Care Act Amendments, 102 St. 4784), the enactment of
several laws to settle claims, or to expand, protect, or create Indian reservations (Land taken into trust for
Pechanga Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, 102 St. 897; Land Claim of Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, 102 St.
1097; Reservation for Confederated Tribe of Grande Ronde Community of Oregon, 102 St. 1594; and Quinault
Reservation Expansion Act, 102 St. 3327), and finally, the enactment of new legislation on important issues

in the areas of political recognition (Lac Vieux Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 102 St. 1577),
economic development (Economic Development Plan for the Northwestern Shoshone, 102 St. 1575), gambling (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102 St. 2467), and water rights (Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights
Settlement Act, 102 St. 2973).
The congressional enactments cited above vary in importance and substance. Several of them, in fact,
are merely minor modifications of preexisting legislation that have had negligible impact in improving either

tribal socio-economic conditions or the structural relationship between tribes and the U.S. Other laws,
meanwhile, are now considered by many Indians and tribal governments as nothing more than fresh and
violative incursions into tribal sovereign rights (i.e., the Indian Gaming Act). Nevertheless, when compared
with the Supreme Court's dynamic duo--Lyng and Smith Il--it is overwhelmingly evident that the Congress
at least is attempting to address and resolve certain issues of importance to tribes while the Supreme Court
seems bent on shattering the always tenuous set of tribal sovereign rights as well as the constitutional rights
American Indian individuals are ostensibly entitled to as federal and state citizens.2

The Problem
This article's principal question is: What explains the disparity between the way the Congress
conceptualizes and deals with tribal sovereignty and the associated religious and cultural practices of tribes

and tribal individuals, and the way the Supreme Court addresses and decides the same issues? This is an
especially critical question because constitutionally Congress is the only branch empowered to treat with
tribes who historically were dealt with at arm's length through treaties and agreements as separate sovereigns.

For generations, (with some few exceptions) the courts relied on the
For generations, (with some few exceptions) the political question doctrine and generally deferred to Congress in the
courts relied on the political question doctrine handling of Indian related issues. And for just as many generations, but
and generally deferred to Congress in the han- particularly after 1871 when Congress froze the treaty process (16 St. 544,

dling of Indian related issues. 566), tribal people and other interested commentators have argued that
this judicial deference to the legislature left tribes without legal redress for
many issues (Coulter, 1977; Shattuck & Norgren, 1979; Newton, 1984); Today, however, the court, while still
sometimes deferring to Congress, has begun to forcefully articulate its own policy position regarding tribal
status and rights; policy statements which, at least insofar as aboriginal religious rights are concerned, have
largely shredded those rights.
Our major question necessarily generates a set of subsidiary questions which must also be addressed:
What is the actual relationship between Congress and American Indian tribes and their citizens? Is Congress

as supportive of tribal autonomy as it seems? If so, and since Congress is vested with the constitutional
authority to develop policies relating to tribes, how do we explain the recent spate of Supreme Court decisions,
particularly Lyng and Smith, which deny constitutional protections to American Indians and ignore congressionally generated (i.e., American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution, 92 St. 469,1978) legislative protections of tribal rights as well? Why, after nearly two centuries of generally consolidated (all three branches
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working together) federal efforts to 1) obliterate tribalism by assimilation or termination, or 2) implement
and sustain federal programs of paternalism which kept tribes locked in dependency relations, or 3) generate
programs and policies which support tribal autonomy by recognizing Indian political and legal rights, and

cultural distinctiveness, or 4) some interesting melange of multiple federal policies with cross-cutting
objectives, is the Congress attempting to resuscitate the negotiated agreement process with tribes while the
Court, on the contrary, is actively engaged in a systematic effort to withdraw or deny American Indians and
tribal groups religious freedom?

Scholarly Findings And Expectations
Because of the profundity of the subject under examination, religious freedom, a wealth of scholarly
literature has been generated on the topic. Within the last five years alone--1987-1991--some thirty-two law
review articles were published dealing with the subject of Indian religious issues, excluding Deloria's works
which will be treated separately (see Index to Legal Periodicals). The majority of these focus on interpretations and explanations of various supreme court cases involving the free exercise clause and Indian religion

cases (e.g., Loftin, 1989; Wyatt, 1989; Collins, 1990; Gordon, 1991; Perry, 1991; Lawson and Morris, 1991;
Echo-Hawk, 1991; Perry, 1991; and Rawlings, 1991). Other articles have focused on topics such as sacred
lands (Brooks, 1990); repatriation of Indians remains (Ravesloot, 1990; Boyd, 1990; and Echo-Hawk, 1990);
problems with application and enforcement of the American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution (Boyles,
1991); and general congressional policy fluctuations over time and their impact on tribal religious beliefs and

practices (Martin, 1990).
Besides the scholarly literature, the federal government's various congressional committees and subcommittees and other federal administrators have also produced a large amount of documentation on the subject,
both historically and currently. Table I depicts the major treaties, laws, and broader policies crafted by the
United States in the last two hundred years which have directly affected the religious beliefs, practices, and
sacred sites of Indians. Table II, more specifically portrays the most recent legislative efforts to either modify
the existing religious freedom law (the 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution, 92 St. 469) or
to overturn or legislatively circumvent those Supreme Court cases which have devastated Indian religious
rights. Furthermore, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs has held two separate hearings (Hearing
100-879 on S. 2250, May 18,1988) and (Hearing 101514 on S. 1124, Sept. 28,1989) on ways to "ensure that the

management of federal lands does not undermine and frustrate traditional native American religious
practices."
These studies and reports, both private and public, have facilitated a deeper awareness of the complex
face of tribal and individual Indian efforts to practice aboriginal religion in the face of private, corporate,
state, and federal agency pressure which often clashes with such practices. They have also illuminated the
U.S. Constitution's highly problematic ability to protect even individual Indian religious beliefs and practices.
Finally, they help explain why various federal court decisions have been handed down which adversely affect
tribal religious practices. However, typically they inadequately treat the complexities and dedistinctive featureat the complexities and distinctive features

of the broader tribal-federal relationship by failing to place the issue of religious freedom within a larger
theoretical, historical, political, and philosophical context. Moreover, since the bulk of existing scholarship
is authored, edited, or coordinated by non-Indians they inadequately portray the moral and cultural authority
of articles, monographs, and books authored by tribal individuals.

One individual whose scholarship meets and exceeds these thresholds is Vine Deloria, Jr., a Standing
Rock Sioux. From his early writing on religious issues (God is Red, 1973; The Metaphysics of Modem Existence,
1979) to his most recent work in the field ("A Simple Question of Humanity: The Moral Dimension of the
Reburial Issue," 1989; "The Reflection and Revelation: Knowing Land, Places, and Ourselves," 1991; "Sacred

Lands and Religious Freedom," 1991; "Worshipping the Golden Calf: Freedom of Religion is Scalia's
America," 1991; and "Trouble in High Places: Erosion of American Indian Rights to Religious Freedom in
the U.S.," 1992), Deloria has employed an eclectic and contextualistic style to write about an amazingly d;verse
set of topics and issues besides religion. He has, for example, published works in the areas of political science
(political theory, American politics, Marxism), law, history, education, economics, philosophy, sociology,

minority affairs, popular culture, and environmental affairs. Deloria has noted on several occasions the

improbability of anyone developing comprehension about the cultural, legal, and political status of tribes in
the United States without in depth reference and analysis of, at a minimum, history, economics, politics, and
morality (1989b: 223).
In fact, in a recent article on the problems associated with the current practice and interpretation of
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Table I:

Congressional Activity Regarding American Indian Religious Freedom
Major Treaties and Laws Major Eederal Indian Policies
Treaty between Kaskaskia Tribe of Illinois and
U.S. in 1803--contained provision in which the

U.S. agreed to pay for services of a Catholic
priest (Kappler, 1903:50)

American Board of Commissioners for fo

sions establish first mission in Indian
Brainerd, Tennessee (1816). (Received financial
support from the federal government.)
Civilization Fund Act, 3 St. 516-17 (Mar 3,1819)

[Between 1819 and 1842, the U.S. provided
$214,500 to missionary societies for the education

of Indians ] Source: Schmeckebier, 1927:40.
[Numerous treaties, i.e., Treaty with the Omaha
Tribe, 1854, and Treaty with the Shawnee (Kap-

pler, 1903:456, 460) contained provisions
whereby the U.S. gave thle fee-simple title of sec-

tions of Indian land to various Christian
denominations engaged in proselytizing and
educating Indians.]

President Grant's Peace Policy (assigned Indian
agencies to Christian denominations) Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, Vol. 7, pp. 109-110, (Dec. 5,

1870).
Courts of Indian Offenses (Sec. of Interior, Annual
Report, Nov. 1, 1883).
Sectarian schools no longer to be funded by U.S., 30

St. 62, 79 (June 7, 1897) [Note: This was repealed
March 30, 1968, 82 St. 71].
Rations to mission schools, 34 St. 326 (June 21,

1906).

Patents of lands to missionary boards of
religious organizations, 42 St. 995 (Sept. 21,
1922)
Comm. of Indian Affairs, John Collier, issues Cir-

cular No. 2970, "Indian Religious Freedom and Indian Culture," (1933) which stated that Indian
religion would no longer be interfered with (Prucha,
1984; Vol. 2, pp. 951-952).

Indian Civil Rights Act, 82 St. 73, 77 (1968).

American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution, 92
St. 469 (Aug. 11, 1978).
Native American Graves Protection and

Repatriation Act, 104 St. 3048 (Nov. 16, 1990).
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Indian law, Deloria says that "[t]he mythical, doctrinally determined history [tihe mythical, doctrinally determined history
which is now entrenched in federal Indian law will be replaced with a more which is now entrenched in federal Indian law will
accurate history only with exceptional difficulty and hardship" (1989b: 223). which is noeplaced th a more accurate l ndian law with
In an earlier article which focused on the question of religion, Deloria more exceptional difficulty and hardship
explicitly observed that:
On balance, the difficulty and of defining the rights or religious freedom for Indians appears to
lie in accommodating the free exercise clause and the establishing clause so that Indians will have
sufficient leeway to exercise their rights without falling under one of the traditional categories of
prohibitions. We must learn how to phrase questions of Indian religious freedom so that we can
begin to achieve the proper results. We must first raise fundamental questions regarding the
nature of all Indian rights: social, political, economic, educational, and religious. We must ask
how Indians received these rights, why they differ in degree and kind from the civil rights of other

American citizens, and how they can be clarified and thereby protected and enforced" (1985:
238).
Mindful of Deloria's admonitions, we focus in the remainder of this article less on doctrinal analysis of
individual Supreme Court cases, since their is ample literature on that, and more on establishing the larger

theoretical, political, institutional, and practical dimensions of this subject so that the question of why
indigenous people currently aree denied constituti iona of their right to practice their religion in a
constitutional democracy can be explained. We begin, therefore, with a discussion of the tribal-congressional
relationship.

THibes As Extra-Constitutional Entities
Chief Justice John Marshall once posited that "the relation of the Indians to the United States [was]
marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831). In penning this striking passage Marshall attempted to define, for the federal government,

the novel political relationship in existThble II ence between Tribes and the United

Recent and Current Bills Involving States. The case and Marshall's inventive
Indian Religious Questions passage are frequently cited even today
by policy-makers, commentators, and
H.R. 1546: Amend the American Indian Religious scholars who wrestle with the idea of raFreedom Act of 1978" (March 21, cially-based tribal nations, the majority of
1989) whom are completely land-locked by
H.R. 5377 "Protect Free Exercise of Religion" (July 26, both state and federal jurisdictions. A
1990) majority of the tribes operate under their

H.R. 2797 "Religious Freedom Restoration Act of own constitutions and they continue to
1991" (June 26, 1991) exercise a myriad of governmental
H.R. 4040 "Religous Freedom Act of 1991" (Nov. 26, powers, some of which may legally con-

1991) flict with the United States Constitution.3
Of more importance, Marshall's

S. 2250 "Improvement of the American Indian phraseology compels one to ask a deeper

Religious Freedom Act" (March 31, set of questions. Is the tribal-federal
1988) relationship as unique as Marshall asS. 1124 'The American Indian Religious Freedom Act serted? If

Amendments of 1989" (June 6, 1989) it was? What, more precisely, urged

S. 1979 "Amendments to the American Indian Marshall initially, and succeeding
Religious Freedom Act" (Nov. 21, generations of scholars, politicians, ad1989) ministrators, and jurists to conclude that
S. 1980 "Repatriation of Native American Group or "peculiar and cardinal distinctions" mark
Cultural Patrimony" (Nov. 21, 1989) the tribal-federal relationship? What are

S. 110 "Amendments of American Indian Religious some of these "peculiarities"? Is it the
Freedom Act"' (January 14, 1991) racial dimension; is it the distinctive

governmental dimension of tribal life and
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the pre- and extra-constitutional connection tribes have to the federal government, evidenced by hundreds
of treaties; is it the sheer volume of separate tribal groups and nations (over 500 at last count); or is it because
over time the Supreme Court has generated a conflicting set of legal fictions and non-constitutional principles
and doctrines (i.e., the "doctrine of discovery," "domestic-dependent" status, "dependency-wardship," etc.)
that acknowledge tribes and their political and property rights as exiting outside the protection of either the
federal constitution or international law?
Actually, it can be, and often is, a strange and vacillating combination of all the above, with an emphasis,
_ we would argue, on the Court's innovative ability to develop legal doctrines

Marshall...is the principal federal figure respon- justifying, on the one hand, the imposition of federal authority over tribal
sible for the current state of tribal-federal rela- lands and citizens; and on the other hand, creating a set of legal (some say

tions. moral, i.e., "trust doctrine") barriers designed to protect tribes from federal

agencies, states, and private parties. Marshall, of course, becaus

enormous intellectual talent, his belief in federal supremacy, his compassion for tribes, and
element of timing, is the principal federal figure responsible for the current state of tribal-fe
A number of writers have critically analyzed Marshall's comments in Cherokee Nation and
important Indian law decisions (Burke, 1969; Deloria, 1983; Ball, 1987; Wilkinson, 1987; and W

Though differing, sometimes vehemently, sometimesin tveheir interpretation of Marshall's doctrines

concurrence that the gifted jurist blended his federalist convictions, a sense of moral l oblig
and a pragmatic need to find a way to reconcile tribal status in the constitutional framework
And while scholars will continue to debate the status of tribal sovereignty as it emerged from
court era, one would be on firm historical and political ground to argue that tribes, in the wor
Justice Thompson in the Cherokee case, were indeed "foreign" to the United States. Thompso

It is their political condition that constitutes their foreign character, and in that sense m

term foreign, be understood as used in the constitution. It can have no relation t

geographical, or territorial position. It cannot mean a country beyond sea. Mexico or Ca
certainly to be considered a foreign country, in reference t the United States. It is the
relation in which one government or country stands to another which constitutes its f
the other (p.55).

Thompson's dissent, it should be noted, played a significant role in Marshall's follow up decis

v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) which affirmed the distinct and independent status of t
and the supremacy of federally-negotiated Indian treaties over state laws.
Why all this discussion about Marshall's early characterizations of tribes and their politica

with the United States? First, to show that the utterances of Chief Justices are sometim
something other than constitutional or legal principles. And second, to show that while Mars

manipulated the description of tribal status and the tribal-federal relationship, this did not bri
the auspices of congressional power. Tribes were still perceived and treated as "foreign" by th
President, and the Congress.

Hence, when George Bush issued his Indian policy on June 14,1991 (Weekly Compilation o
Documents, Vol. 27, No. 25: 783-784), which supported the "government-to-government" relat
tween tribal nations and the United States, he was acknowledging the persistence of that sam
political relationship. Clearly, this relationship has experienced transformations and vacillatio
these include demographic (the gross decline of tribal populations contrasted by the steady rise
populations) as well as political and legal changes, most of which were unilaterally inaugurate
States (see, for example, Ball, 1987). But notions of tribal cultural and political autonomy rem
many tribes, though for others it is more problematic (Prucha, 1985).
_________________________ ~Descriptions of tribes as "governments" stem from their

The U.S. Constitution mentions Indians three original sovereigns of America with whom various Eur
times... later the United States, engaged in hundreds of legally binding treaties and

-'"""""'~~~ ~~agreements. Clearly, the tribes' sovereign status (thoug

such status as "quasi-sovereign, domestic-dependent") continued throughout the Colon
federation, the Northwest Ordinance, and the establishment of the Constitution.
The U.S. Constitution mentions Indians three times: 1) twice Indians are excluded f
tion tabulations for determining congressional representatives (Article 1, sec. 2, cl. 3 "..
taxed..." and the 14th Amendment, sec. 2, which also refers to "Indians not taxed"); and
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referenced in the Commerce Clause (Article 1, sec. 8, cl. 3) which provides that Congress is empowered "To

regulate commerce with foreign nations ... states ... and with the Indian tribes." The Commerce Clause is
the only explicit source of power delegated to Congress. It is, moreover, a "power allocation among competing

power users governed by the Constitution ... [but] it is not an ascription of power as between Congress and
the tribes because the Indians were apparently not intended to be included and were in fact not included
within the coverage of the Constitution" (Rottenberg, 1986: 411).
Theoretically, the Commerce Clause should not extend to Congress any greater power over tribes than

it exercises over states, though in historical and contemporary practice such has not been the case.5 For
example, while the Supreme Court has held that "the sovereignty of the states is limited by the Constitution
itself" (Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1984)), states enjoy legal and
constitutional protection against arbitrary federal action because of the doctrine of enumerated powers.
The question of enumeration represents one of the most problematic aspects of the political conflict

between tribes and the U.S. In constitutional law matters not involving tribes, the Court has generally
maintained, as it did in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), that the U.S. "is a government of enumerated
powers" (p. 88). The Court acknowledged, as it has on many occasions, that the Constitution, "is not to be

construed technically and narrowly," but went on to say that "it is still true that no independent and
unmentioned power passes to the National Government or can rightfully be exercised by the Congress" (Ibid.).

When Congress deals with tribes, however, additional variables are considered: e.g., the treaty, not
constitutionally-defmined political relationship, and the pre- and extra-constitutional status of tribes. These
features enable the Court to sometimes utilize implicit and non-constitutionally derived doctrines to justify
judicial or congressional actions (e.g., wardship, "discovery" principle, "implicit divestiture," etc.) that would
not withstand legal scrutiny if applied to any other individual or group. (Cohen, 1972 ed.: 170).
The combined effect of these distinctive constitutional and non-constitutional features is illustrated by

the statement that general congressional laws are inapplicable to Indian .-I. ..___._ __ __

tribes, "if their application would affect the Indians adversely, unless con- ...the constitutional clauses already mentioned-

gressional intent to include them is clear" (Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 commerce, enumeration, and treaty-makin
(1884); Cohen, 1972 ed.: 173). Moreover, there is solid historical and plus the power of making war and peace do n

constitutional support for the doctrine that "Congress has no constitutional explicitly grant the federal government the pow
power over Indians except what is conferred by the Commerce Clause and to regulate Indians or Indian affairs.
other clauses of the Constitution" (Cohen, 1972 ed.: 90). More importantly,

it must be remembered that the constitutional clauses already mentioned--commerce, enumeration, and
treaty-making--plus the power of making war and peace do not explicitly grant the federal government the
power to regulate Indians or Indian affairs. The Commerce Clause, the only explicit power, merely states
that Congress will be the branch to treat with Indian tribes. A corollary to this principle of congressional

enumeration, identified by Cohen, involved the power of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs who is
authorized to oversee "the management of all Indian affairs [of the federal government]" but whose office
over time came to be read as having the power of "the management of all the affairs of Indians" (Cohen, 1953:

352).

Having elaborated on the extra-constitutional status of tribes, let us nowbriefly describe individual Indian

status; for it is this unique conjunction of rights individual and collective--in part that fundamentally
distinguish Indians from the rest of the American populace. Before 1924 nearly two-thirds of all Indians had
received federal citizenship via treaty provisions or individual allotments. Following World War I, the federal
government unilaterally extended the franchise to all other Indians (43 St. 253), though Commissioner Leupp
asserted as late as 1905 that there was no "authority of law to naturalize Indians" (1905: 60). This extension
of citizenship did not, however, enfranchise tribes, and it did not impair preexisting tribal rights. Hence, there
was now a class of people, Indians, with dual, later triple citizenship (when the individual states extended the
franchise to Indians) (Martin, 1990).
As federal citizens, Indians are ostensibly accorded the same constitutional safeguards and rights as other
Americans. But national citizenship has not always proven an adequate shield of Indian political, civil, and
especially, property rights. Why? To understand this we must analyze the Supreme Court case which most
forcefully addressed, and in fact formalized the issue of multiple tribal citizenship. The major case is U.S. v.

Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916). There, the Court held that an enfranchised Indian allottee was still subject to
congressional power. Congress's power, said Chief Justice Van DeVanter, had both a constitutional (Commerce) and an extra-constitutional (tribal "dependency") base. Van DeVanter said that "citizenship is not
incompatible with tribal existence or continued guardianship and so may be conferred without completely
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emancipating the Indian or placing them beyond the reach of congressional regulations adopted for their
protection" (p. 598).
In essence, and ironically, Nice served to seal the status of tribal Indians in perpetual legal and political
limbo during an era when the federal government's primary policy goal remained detribalization, individualization, and assimilation. Henceforth, tribal members who had secured citizenship were simultaneously recognized as federal citizens and dependent peoples subject to overriding congressional authority.
With this fascinating dichotomous status enshrined in federal law a logical question is: what exactly does
federal citizenship really bestow upon tribal citizens? Ostensibly, it should mean that the federal government
retains no more power to legislate Indian lives and property than it does the lives and property of any other
citizen. In fact, however, the U.S. has asserted, at its discretion, plenary authority over the political affairs as
well as the civil and property rights of not only tribes but individual Indians as well (Coulter, 1974,1979;

Deloria, 1977,1985; Barsh and Henderson, 1980; Carter, 1976; Newton, 1984; and Ball, 1987).

Congressional Plenary Power--What Does it Really Mean?
In the preceding section we have analyzed a number of interesting topics, doctrines, and issues: triple
citizenship, extra-constitutional status, exclusive federal (congressional) authority in the field of Indian affairs,
and treaty-based tribal rights. In the ensuing section we look closely at one of the most intriguing doctrines
in the field of political science, constitutional law, and Indian law and policy: plenary power. For this concept
of plenary entails the soul of what is sometimes deemed a constitutional impasse with, on the one hand, the

U.S. acknowledging the sovereignty of American Indian tribal governments, and, on the other hand,
sometimes extending its allegedly politically superior position in relation to tribes.
There is considerable disagreement among scholars and federal lawmakers on whether plenary power-when defined as exclusive--is a necessary congressional power which only the Congress may exercise free of

typical constitutional constraints because the Constitution cannot protect tribal rights because of their
extra-constitutional status (Cohen, 1972 ed.; Deloria, 1985: Wilkinson, 1987); or whether plenary--when
defined as unlimited and absolute--is an aberrant and non-democratic doctrine which Congress sometimes
arbitrarily uses to oppress or even eradicate tribal or individual political, civil, or property rights (Krieger,

1933; Cohen, 1948; Deloria, 1977; Newton, 1984; Ball, 1987; Kronowitz, 1987). We will see that both
definitions have been utilized, but will argue that in the last twenty years or so the political branches have
more correctly relied on their exclusive power to deal with tribes.
First cited by the Supreme court in the seminal case, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824),
plenary power has often been used by the federal courts in cases dealing
...plenary power has often been used by the federal with federal powers. It is a concept, however, which fosters confusion

courts in cases dealing with federal powers. "because it conceals several issues which, for purposes of constitutional
analysis must be kept clear and distinct" (Engdahl, 1976: 363). Engdahl
incorrectly posits, however, that "no federal power is plenary in the full sense of the term, because as to all of
them at least the prohibition of the Bill of Rights apply" (Ibid.). The U.S. Bill of Rights, as we noted earlier,
are inapplicable to tribal governments because tribal nations were not created pursuant to the Constitution.
While the Indian Civil Rights act (82 St. 77-80) applies certain portions of the constitutional Bill of Rights to
tribal governments in regards to their activities over reservation residents, the Bill of Rights does not protect
tribes or their members from congressional actions.
The other more important factor promoting misunderstanding of the term plenary is because the concept
"merge[s] several analytically distinct questions" (Ibid.). First, and especially important for our purposes,

there is plenary meaning exclusive. This is the definition used most frequently when Congress enacts
Indian-specific legislation, like the Indian Reorganization Act (48 St. 985), or when it enacts Indian Preference

laws which withstand reverse discrimination suits (Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)). This is an
exclusively legislative power which the Congress may exercise in keeping with its policy of treating with tribes

in a distinctively political manner or when deemed appropriate to provide a recognition of rights (i.e.,
American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution, 92 St. 469) that Indians have been deprived of because of
their extra-constitutional standing. As Deloria astutely notes:
There may indeed be some kind of establishment of religious freedom for American Indians. If
so, it is because Congress has dealt with the question of the practice of Indian religions and felt
it to be necessary to extend the protection of federal laws further in the case of Indians than the
Constitution allows it to extend to ordinary citizens. In this instance Indians are not to be regarded
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as 'supercitizens'; rather the practice of Indian religion is to be regarded as under the special
protections of the federal government in the same way that Indian water rights, land titles, and
self-government are protected. Congress has always dealt with Indians in a special manner; that
is why Congress and the federal court's cherish and nourish the doctrine of plenary powers in the
field of Indian affairs" (1985: 247).
Second, plenary is also defined as an exercise of federal power which may preempt state law. Again, the
Congress's commerce power is an example, as is the treaty-making process, which precludes state involvement. Constitutional disclaimers that a majority of Western States had to include in their organic documents
before they were admitted as states are also evidence of federal preemption.6 Finally, there is plenary meaning
unlimited or absolute (Newton, 1984: 196, note 3). This third definition includes two subcategories: a) power
which is not limited by other textual constitutional provisions; and b) power which is unlimited regarding

congressional objectives (Ibid.). There is ample evidence in Indian law and policy of plenary power being
applied to tribes by the federal government in all three ways.7
When the U.S. Congress is exercising plenary power as the exclusive voice of the federal government in
its relations with tribes, and is acting with the consent of the tribal people, then it is exercising authority in a
legitimate manner. Also, when Congress is acting in a plenary way to preempt state intrusion into Indian

Country, absent tribal consent, then it is properly exercising an enumerated constitutional power. However,
when congress is informed by the federal courts that it has "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, and
unqualified" (Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 134 P.2d 976 (1942)) authority over tribes and individual Indian
citizens, something is fundamentally wrong. Canfield, writing in 1881, long before individual Indians were

enfranchised, correctly observed that congressional power over tribes was absolute because tribes were
distinct and independent, if "inferior" peoples, "strangers to our law, our customs, and our privileges." He
went on to say that "[t]o suppose that the framers of the Constitution intended to secure to the Indians the
rights and privileges which they valued as Englishmen is to misconceive the spirit of their age..." (p. 26-27).
But by the time Mashunkashey was decided, in 1942, all Indians had been enfranchised and yet they were
informed by the court that absolute power was a reality confronting them.

In a constitutional democracy, defined as a system of governance that places formal limits on what
government can do, even exclusive authority has some limits. Tribes, however, because of their extra-constitutional status, cannot rely upon express constitutional provisions, particularly those found in the Bill of
Rights, to limit what the federal government or its constituent branches do. Unfortunately, because of the

Nice case and the interpretations given that decision and others by the Rehnquist court, even individual
Indians who should be entitled to constitutional protections as citizens, find that in the area of religious
expression and belief the first amendment does not afford them the necessary protection to practice their
religion or have access to sacred sites.
For purposes of this paper let us return our attention to the present situation where, as we argued earlier,
it appears that the Congress because of its exclusive constitutional allocation of authority to treat with tribes,

is arguably more supportive of tribal self-determination, congressional plenary power (when defined as
unlimited) not withstanding.

A Return to Bilateral Relations
General legislative support8 for tribal autonomy has been evident since a spate of federal activity and
legislation in the 1970s9 focused on the disavowal, though not official renunciation, of the termination policy.
Termination was to be replaced by a more enlightened, though still flawed,10 policy of tribal self-determina-

tion. A crucial dimension in Congress' quest to facilitate improved relations with tribes centered on the
problems tribal people faced in attempting to access sacred sites, utilize sacred objects, and practice
traditional religions, as a result of inconsistent and sometimes insensitive federal administrative policies and
practices which hampered the Indians' religious rights.
The history of the federal government's ultimate goal of the destruction of American Indian cultural
identity, especially aboriginal religions from the early treaty period through

the 1920s is well documented (Prucha, 1979; Sewell, 1983; Barsh, 1986; The history of the federal government's ultima
Martin, 1991). Once tribal identity and all vestiges of culture had been goal of the destruction of American Indian cul
eradicated, Judeo-Christian ethics, beliefs, and institutions, officially sanc- tural identity...is well documented.

tioned and financially supported by federal tax dollars as well as Indian
treaty funds, a clear violation of separation of church and state doctrine, were to be the vehicle through which
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this assimilation and Americanization were to take place. For much of this period, but beginning most
systematically with Grant's Peace Policy in the late 1860s (see, for example, Prucha, 1976) various Christian
denominations struggled mightily to impart their religion to tribal people. The freedom of religion that these
groups exercised to full advantage, however, completely disregarded the religious views and rights of Indians.
"By religious freedom," says Prucha, "they [Christians] meant liberty of action on the reservations for their
own missionary activities. 'The Indians have a right, under the Constitution, as much as any other person in
the Republic... to the full enjoyment of liberty of conscience; accordingly they have the right to choose
whatever Christian belief they wish, without interference from the Government'" (Prucha, 1976: 57 quoting
"Address of the Catholic Clergy..." 1874).
In fact, despite the extension of the federal franchise to a majority of Indians under the 1887 General
Allotment Act (24 St. 388), with the remainder receiving citizenship in 1924 (43 St. 253), the fundamental
question of constitutional protection for aboriginal tribal religions and the constitutional prohibition against
an establishment of religion, in this case, Christianity among the tribes, were non-issues until the late 1970s

(Deloria, 1985: 245).
Congress finally responded to the lobbying efforts of tribal people and non-Indian advocates of Indian

rights by enacting the American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution (92 St. 469) in 1978. This joint
resolution declared that henceforth, it would be the policy of the United States "to protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of
the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to, access to sales, use
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rites" (Ibid.).
The fact of the resolution's enactment was a clear admission on the part of the Congress that American

Indian religious rights had not been protected, in part because of the anomalous status of Indians as both
citizens and subjects, as Nice had put it. Hence, Congress, exercising its plenary legislative authority (defined
as exclusive) recognized a need to legislatively extend federal protection of religious rights to tribal individuals
because the first amendment of the constitution failed to protect those rights (Deloria, 1985: 247).
By the end of the 1970s the flurry of congressional activity ended as a recession and Reagan's budget ax
took over. Congress continued to enact sporadic legislation (i.e., Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 (96

St. 2519)) throughout the 1980s. However, a more significant development with potentially long range
ramifications for tribes and the tribal-federal relationship began as a result of an investigative series which
appeared in the Arizona Republic newspaper the week of October 4-11,1987. The series, entitled "Fraud in
Indian Country: A Billion Dollar Betrayal," written by M.N. Trahant, Andy Hall, and Mark Shaffer, was a
major investigation of the federal government's gross inability to meet the basic human needs of American
Indians in the areas of health, natural resource protection and utilization, housing, protection from sexual
deviants, and education. This despite expenditures of several billion dollars annually.
In fact, noted the reporters, federal Indian programs "are a shambles, plagued by fraud, incompetence,
and deceit and strangled by a morass of red tape that has all but destroyed their effectiveness" (Arizona
Republic, October 4,1987: 1). This series prompted the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1987

to form a Special Committee on Investigations, co-chaired by Arizona's senators, Messrs. DeConcini and
McCain. The Committee was charged to "uncover fraud, corruption and mismanagement in American Indian
Affairs, no matter where or to whom it led." Their two-year investigation included the examination of over a
million and a half documents, many of which were subpoenaed; interviews with 2,010 current and former
governmental officials and employees, tribal officials, energy leaders, etc.; visits with more than seventy
recognized tribes; and twenty days of public hearings. The hearing transcripts alone span eleven volumes,
totalling nearly 3,500 pages.
This two-year investigation corroborated what the Republic's staffers had found in a short six-month
period. While uncovering scandals and gross federal incompetence and corruption in a myriad of areas, the
final report summarized the committee's findings in the following areas: corruption was rampant in the
implementation of the Indian preference statute; numerous cases of Indian
...the principal problem was an anachronistic con- child sexual abuse by BIA employees were documented; gross mismanagegressional and administrative paternalism that ment and theft of tribal resources was identified; poor quality and inade-

denies to tribes and their citizenry genuine quately funded health care continued to be a major problem; there was

autonomy. ample documentation of substandard housing; and a significant amount of

tribal elite corruption was uncovered. In answer to its own question of why
so much corruption, fraud, and mismanagement still pervaded federal institutions which serve Indians, the

committee asserted that the principal problem was an anachronistic congressional and administrativ
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paternalism that denies to tribes and their citizenry genuine autonomy.
In order to terminate such paternalism, the Committee urged the rekindling of negotiated agreements.
Termed "New Federalism," this policy would consist of bilateral agreements with tribes that while continuing
to provide required federal funding, would also for the first time in over one hundred years, "allow tribal

governments to stand free independent, responsible and accountable" (Senate Rep't. 101-216,1989: 16).
These agreements, it is important to note, would be entirely consensual, and would not affect any prior rights
or obligations a tribe may have as a result of "treaties, former agreements, or existing claims against the U.S."
(p.17). They would also not modify the tribes' current legal status or their jurisdictional standing in relations
to tribes. In essence, tribes could choose to enter new agreements with the federal government which would
finally recognize the tribal right to assume direct responsibility for their own affairs.

Chairman Sidney Yates (D., Ill.), of the House Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee called an oversight hearing in late November 1987 to address the charges made by the Republic's
reporters. Secretary of Interior Hodel and Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Ross Swimmer sought to

address the newspaper's allegations. "In obvious frustration and perhaps to direct Chairman Yates' displeasure, Swimmer suggested that the BIA moneys should be turned over to the Tribes to let them manage
their own affairs. After Chairman Yates met with Tribal representatives on the Swimmer proposal... ten tribes,

including our four Tribes, Quinault, Lummi, Jamestown S'Klallam, and Hoopa, volunteered to test the
proposal" (Joint Testimony, Hearing on H.R. 3394, Oct. 3,1991). Thus was set in motion a potentially
revolutionary set of events, although the Department of Interior and the BIA attempted, without prior
consultation with the volunteer tribes, to thwart the process by proposing an amendment to the 1975 Indian
Self-Determination Act which would have resulted in a transfer of resources but with minor effect on the
existing BIA bureaucracy. More significantly, this proposal included language that would have waived the
federal government's trust responsibility for programs assumed by participating tribes. The tribes effectively
counter-attacked this measure and had it stricken before final enactment of the 1988 Self-Determination

Amendments (Ibid., p. 2).
By December of 1987, Congress (which also had to act in a capacity to force the BIA to desist from its
subverting tactics), a recalcitrant BIA and tribal leaders had reached agreement in principle on the estab-

lishment of the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project (TSGDP, n.d.: 10). Originally designed to
allow ten tribesl1 (with another ten to be selected from a pool of tribal applicants) the opportunity to create
their own budgets to address tribally-determined priorities, the project was enacted as part of the Appropria-

tion Act of 1988 and later supplemented and clarified as Title III of the 1988 Amendments to the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (102 St. 2285, 2296). In the words of a Lummi leader:
The Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project is our opportunity to open doors that may
lead to a new Indian affairs agenda--one in which tribes will reestablish the formal governmentto-government relationship between tribal governments and the U.S. government, a relationship
that is inherent and intended in the treaties between our governments. This project will also

release the 135-year federal bureaucratic hold on tribes so we can determine and manage our
own governmental affairs and responsibilities ("Shaping Our Own Future," n.d.: 3).

The TSGDP is considered "the most advanced expression of the policy of Indian Self-Determination"
("Shaping Our Own Future," n.d.: 6). Intended to reaffirm the political relationship between tribes and the
U.S. based on the doctrine of consent, these experimental tribes have the opportunity to redesign programs,
reallocate funds, and plan and deliver services appropriate to their citizens. More broadly, the Project tribes
are empowered to actively promote economic, political, and social self-sufficiency through the transfer of
federal funds which formerly flowed to the BIA, but which will now go directly to the tribes, once the tribe
has negotiated an annual written funding agreement with the Secretary of Interior ("Shaping Our Own Future,"

1991: 2-3).
The timing of this policy experiment, beginning as it did a year before the Senate's Final Report on the
regnant corruption and incompetence lacing the BIA and virtually every federal agency which administers
programs for Indians, indicates that the political branches of the federal government, at least, in this instance,
are operating proactively and not defensively. Originally a five-year policy experiment to involve twenty tribes

and slated to end in 1993, it was recently extended by legislation on December 4,1991 (105 St. 1278). The
extension involves time (an additional three years) and tribes (from 20 to 30). The extension was requested

by tribes and agreed to by Congress to allow more time for an evaluation of the program on a wider

cross-section of tribes.
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Predicting either the direction or substance of Indian policy is impossible. And it is far too early to tell
what will come of the idea of "New Federalism" or the TSGDP. However, unlike the 1975 Self-Determination
Act which was stymied by inadequate funds, old alliances involving BIA staff
Predicting either the direction or substance of at the local and area level and certain tribal officials, and, most importantly,

Indian policy is impossible. the fact that it actually returned very little direct governmental power to
tribes, the current process of self-governance, because of direct tribal
involvement, including more experienced tribal leaders, plus the procedural and substantive safeguards
included in contracted agreements, has significantly greater potential to return tribal-federal relations to a
level closely resembling the position outlined in the original Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
The task will not be easy, particularly when the tribes are confronted by a bloated and inefficient BIA
bureaucracy that is more interested in preserving its institutional existence than in supporting tribal self-determination. The tribes involved in the TSGDP are committed, however, to the program. It is also evident that

the Congress is generally supportive as is the Bush Administration, notwithstanding the occasional, if
predictable, actions of certain Interior Department personnel.
We move our attention now to the federal courts, particularly the activities and inactivities of the supreme
court which is heading off into its own direction, congressional plenary (exclusive) authority, New Federalism,
and Tribal Self-Governance notwithstanding.

Judicial Supremacy in Decision-Making
A survey conducted by the Los Angeles Times in the summer of 1991 revealed some interesting results
regarding overall public sentiment on the Supreme Court. The findings indicate that the American public
holds a generally favorable view of the court (53 percent favorable, 23 percent unfavorable, 24 percent haven't
heard enough); believes that the Court is ideologically situated about where it should be and is neither too
liberal nor too conservative (50 percent say it is "just about right," 26 percent say it is "too conservative," 15
percent say it is too liberal, and 9 percent are not sure); and says that the Court's present position in the
American system of separation of powers is just about right (63 percent say the Court has just the "right
amount of power," 12 percent say it is "not powerful enough," 21 percent say that it is "too powerful," while 4
percent are not sure) (The Ladd Report, 1991: 24-26).
With regard to recent Supreme Court decisions, the Times study shows clearly, but not surprisingly, that
while the public is not very knowledgeable about details of the Court's activity, they have vacillating opinions

depending on the issue involved. This survey, however, did not pose a question about the Court's recent
Indian cases. But one could hazard a guess that had they queried the general public on cases like Duro, Cotton
Petroleum, Smith II, and Lyng, the response would have been virtual silence, since tribal issues are even more
peripheral than everyday political and social topics. As Deloria notes in a recent article, even more surprising
than the opinion of Justice Scalia in Smith II and O'Conner in Lyng has been "the absence of any sense of
outrage from American Christians" (1991c: 23).
Had the pollsters interviewed American Indians, on the other hand, both as to their overall perception
of the Court as well as their attitudes about specific cases, the results, more

...the religious rights of American Indians, al- than likely, would have been far less flattering. In fact, contrary to
though explicitly recognized by the Congress in Washburn's contention in a 1984 article that "there is no question that the
the 1978 Religious Freedom Resolution, have been religious rights of American Indians, after hundreds of years of assault, are

devastated by federal court activity. more fully protected than ever before" (p. 53), virtually all the data emanating from the federal courts, even before 1984 (see Table III) show that just
the opposite is transpiring--the religious rights of American Indians, although explicitly recognized by the

Congress in the 1978 Religious Freedom Resolution, have been devastated by federal court activity. The
majority of the cases, not coincidentally, have been decided since the Religious Freedom policy directive.
Table III entails the major federal court cases involving questions related to Indian religious freedom.
Note that only Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council (1959) is a substantial victory for the tribes.
This case, however, did not involve a federal, state, or private activity in direct conflict with the rights of
American Indians to protect their religion or access to sacred sites. Instead, it was an important case affirming
the inapplicability of the constitutional first amendment to tribal governments.
What explains the other ten cases, nine of which were handed down in the years subsequent to Congress'
policy directive on the issue? Why is the Court acting in a way that directly clashes with congressional goals
and intent, particularly in regard to religious freedom for Indians? And why is it that for the Indians, both

individually and as tribes, despite the federal and state citizenship status tribal individuals have, the
52

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Wed, 16 Oct 2019 17:32:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Table III:

Federal Court Activity Regarding American Indian Religious Freedom

Quick Bear vs. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908): Treaty funds; First Amendment-Establishment (Tribe: Lakota)
Holding: Federal statute prohibiting appropriations to sectarian schools only applied to
gratuitous appropriations and public moneys, not Indian treaty funds, which were paid by the
government to fulfill treaty provisions.
Native American Church vs. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F. 2d 131 (1959): Applicability of First Amendment

to Tribal Nations; peyote (Tribe: Navajo)
Holding: First Amendment does not restrict actions of tribal governments on question of
religious freedom.
Sequoyah vs. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F. 2d 1159 (6th Cir., 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980):

First Amendment-Free Exercise; sacred Indian sites--Chota, TN (Tribe: Cherokee)

Holding: Cherokees' interest in protecting land was not sufficiently "religious" to invoke First
Amendment protection.
Badoni vs. Higginson, 638 F. 2d 172 (10th Cir., 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981): First Amendment--

Free Exercise; sacred Indian sites on "public" lands--Rainbow Bridge, AZ (Tribe: Navajo)
Holding: Navajo religious use of Rainbow Bridge, however indispensable to Navajo life, could
not outweigh the economic benefits (electricity and tourism) generated by the Glen Canyon Dam.

Fools Crow vs. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd., 706 F 2d 856 (9th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 464

U.S. 977 (1984): First Amendment--Free Exercise; sacred Indian sites on "public" lands--Bear Butte, SD
(Tribes: Lakota, Cheyenne and others)
Holding: Tourism and other development do not pose a "substantial burden" to the Indians' free
exercise of religion. Promotion of tourism is a "compelling" state interest.

Wilson vs. Block, 708 F. 2d 735 (D.C. Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1984): First Amendment--Free

Exercise and Establishment; sacred Indian sites on "public" lands--San Francisco Peaks, AZ (Tribes: Navajo
and Hopi)
Holding: U.S. Forest Service may expand ski resort area on federal land despite Indian arguments
that the expansion would desolate the area and violate their religious rights.
Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope vs. US., 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), affd., 746 F. 2d 570 (9th

Cir., 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820 (1985): First Amendment--Free Exercise; sacred area--Arctic Sea
(Tribe: Inupiat)
Holding: Federal government may grant petroleum leases despite Inupiat assertions of religious
use and aboriginal title.
Bowen vs. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986): First Amendment--Free Exercise; administrative policy (Tribe: Abenaki)
Holding: Free exercise does not require the government to conduct its internal affairs (requiring
an Indian child to have a Social Security number) in ways that comported with the religious beliefs
of citizens.

Lyng vs. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988): First Amendment--Free
Exercise; sacred Indian sites--Chimney Rock area of northern California (Tribes: Yurok, Karok and Tolowa)
Holding: Denied free exercise challenge to federal highway project that will destroy Indian
religious sites.

US. vs. Means, 858 F 2d 404 (8th Cir., 1988): First Amendment--Free Exercise; public lands--Black Hills,
SD (Tribe: Lakota)
Holding: U.S. Forest Service did not violate Free Exercise clause in denying Sioux Indians a
special permit to use 800 acres of national forest as a religious, cultural and educational
community.

Employment Division vs. Smitth, 1105 Ct. 1595, 108 L. ed. 2d 876 (1990): First Amendment--Free Exercise;
peyote; state criminal law (Tribe: Klamath)
Holding: The Free Exercise clause permits the state to prohibit sacramental peyote use and thus
to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use.
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constitution's first amendment protections do not apply in any fundamental way? These are the questions we
attempt to answer in this last section of the article.

Before setting out our explanations it behooves us, first, to assert our position that the Court is a
policy-making institution. Next, we must describe what this assertion means, since it is often made without
explanation. Dahl once observed that "as a political institution the Court is highly unusual, not least because
Americans are not quite willing to accept the fact that it is a political institution, and not quite capable of
denying it" (1957: 278). Clearly, the Court is not an ordinary political institution, however. It is, first of all, a
court of law. Second, there is an obvious interrelationship between law and politics. Finally, the Court can
best be understood in terms of the interaction between and merger of two traditions which are identified as

the "legal subculture" and the "democratic subculture" (Richardson and Vines, 1970). The precise spot on
the continuum where the Court settles to render a decision is usually determined by several factors: the issue
before the court; the court's composition (who is sitting on the bench); and the court's ideological complexion.
Viewing the Court as having a political dimension and studying it from a political perspective facilitates a
sharper understanding of it for several reasons: 1) it helps define the Court's contribution to the determination

of public policy decisions; 2) it enables us to formulate a more accurate picture of the Court vis-a-vis other

governmental institutions; and 3) it enables us to describe and understand the recruitment of judicial
candidates and the Court's decision-making process in terms similar to the ones used to describe say, the
recruitment of political candidates and how and why they vote as they do (Grossman and Wells, 1988: 3-4).

Three Theories of Judicial Decision-Making
Scholarly views regarding the Court's stance in national policy-making are disparate, but can generally
be grouped in one of three categories: the court as legitimator, as initiator, or as an imperial entity. First,
let us look at the legitimacy perspective. Briefly, Dahl (1957) and Funston (1975) have corroborating views
that the Supreme Court has not, generally speaking, substituted its policy goals for those of law-making
majorities, and that even when the Court has sought to do that, it has not been very successful. The main task
of the court, according to Dahl, is to confer legitimacy on the fundamental policies of the dominant alliance.
A court is, of course, an active participant in the ruling national coalition which dominates U.S. politics, but
it fails to perform the task of protecting fundamental minority rights against majority demands that is often
attributed to it. Why? Because as a member of the ruling coalition, its decisions are typically supportive of
the policies emerging from the political branches. Theorists of this school do acknowledge that the Court is
more than an agent, acting solely to confer legitimacy on the political branches decisions. But for Dahl, the
court is cautious and will avoid blatant opposition to the dominant alliance for fear of losing its legitimacy.
This theory has been challenged by scholars like Casper (1976) and Choper (1980) who recognize in the
Court's litigative record a more active role which holds that the judicial arm has more staunchly, albeit in
sporadic fashion, defended basic liberties and minority rights by exercising its authority to act as an initiator
of public policy if necessary. While the political branches have at times been more sensitive to certain personal
liberties than the Court, the usual pattern is the opposite. On issues such as slavery, public financial assistance

to sectarian schools, individual liberty and the conflict of internal security, and the political and socioeconomic rights of racial minorities, "[C]ongress has recognized that political expediency often renders it
impotent to uphold the constitutional rights of vulnerable minorities and that it would not be displeased to
have the Court set the record straight" (Choper, 1980: 68).

Theorists of this school draw a picture of the Court's actions which extends far beyond those of
legitimation alone. Casper (1976) carefully dissected Dahl's analysis and argued that the Court will often
seize the initiative and will create policies other institutions are unwilling or unable to promulgate (p. 60).
The Court, said Casper, is not only far more active--it has struck down legislation more frequently today than
when Dahl's article appeared (1957), but its decisions largely have not been reversed by legislation, constitutional amendment, or by a reversal by the Court.
Furthermore, Casper noted that Dahl's analysis was flawed because it was based upon the premise that
policy-making is best described in terms of influence and power, winners and losers. The Supreme Court's
policy-making process is far more than a win-lose, zero-sum situation, argued Casper. It is, instead, a dynamic
process "in which even 'losers' contribute importantly to outcomes that eventually emerge" (pp. 61-62). In
short, conflicts among political institutions produce not "winning" and "losing" policies but rather "tentative
solutions that themselves become the basis for future policy-making." Examples of contested but largely
unresolved issues include the fishing rights struggles of the Great Lakes and Northwest Coast regions, racial
equality, legislative reapportionment, church-state relations, and criminal procedure.
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The third theoretical perspective, most forcefully articulated by Agresto (1985), and the one most
pertinent for our discussion, posits as its central premise that the court is an imperial body wielding judicial
supremacy. Agresto says that the Supreme Court is imperial not as a result of its activism, nor is it imperial

simply because its decisions are largely "unchecked." "It is imperial," Agresto argues, and exceedingly
dangerous because it is active and unchecked in its ability to be the creator, the designer, of new social policy.
The Court has the "unhindered ability not simply to prevent legislative acts but to govern affirmatively outside
the boundaries of either checks and balances or democratic traditions" (p. 11). While recognizing that the
court is entitled to exercise judicial review, Agresto believes the Court has gone too far and operates without
any restraints on its activity (p. 37). This is the paradox, according to Agresto: How, he asks, can we allow
the Court to be powerful and let it be the developer of fundamental principles without substituting its own

principles for the Constitution (pp. 156-157).
Agresto believes that the will of the national majority enacted into law will generally contain enough
protection for the rights of minorities (p. 30). Interestingly, he sees the court as only "marginally connected
to democratic choice." The justices, "unelected, life-tenured, with secure salaries, have plenary power over
the interpretation of the nation's fundamental law and authority to direct private and public activity in accord
with their opinion of the demands of that Constitution. And when the Court uses that authority to stand
against the democratic will or to direct public policy, we are unsure what to think, much less what to do about

it" (p. 36).
For Agresto, the solution to judicial supremacy is for the three branches to begin acting as partners, as
though they were coordinate with one another. Congress, according to Agresto, especially needs to reassert

its authority to interpret the Constitution. "If the Court has decided wrongly Congress should... force a
reconsideration of the constitutional issue. Just as the Supreme Court should encourage Congress to engage
in sober second thinking, so too should Congress engage the Court in such thinking" (Kommers, 1985: 120).
Not surprisingly, one can find evidence in Indian history, law, and policy supportive of each of these
policy-making positions utilized by the Court.12 But it is Agresto's theoretical perspective of an imperial

judiciary that most accurately capsulizes the Rehnquist Court's collective attitude and recent decisions,
particularly on the subject of Indian religious freedom. This is most evident when we compare the court's
activity over the last decade or so with the enactments and policy directives adopted by the political branches.
In fact, it is fairly evident based on the cases diagrammed in Table III that the religious rights, practices, and

beliefs of both tribes and individual Indians are considered as belonging not to the actual practitioners
themselves, but to the subjective domain13 of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Court in this area of law

deems itself as the "ruler" of the polity rather than as an interpreter of the Constitution or congressional
enactments. The Court is no longer checking legislative actions or legitimating congressional or executive
activity; nor is it acting in a dynamic way to address social and political issues that the Congress or President
are negligent in addressing. Instead, it is involved in a revolutionary attempt to reshape Indian societies and
their belief systems in a manner consistent with what the Court deems appropriate and in direct contradistinction to what the political branches are supporting. "More often," says Kommers, the Court in recent years
has not guided constitutional dialogue or served as a generator of "sober second thought in the larger political
community." It has instead, "stopped the conversation, concluded the argument, and foreclosed any policy

other than the one it has mandated" (1985: 120). This certainly seems to be the case when questions of

American Indian religious rights come before the Court.

The Rehnquist Court and Indian Rights
There is general agreement that the Supreme Court is functioning in an imperial manner when it comes
to the subject of American Indian religious rights (see, for example, Sewell, 1983; Barsh, 1986; Loftin, 1989;

Wyatt, 1989; Boyles, 1991; Deloria, 1988,1989a, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, and 1992). Restating our original
question: Why has the court consistently failed to extend constitutional first amendment protection to Indian

and tribes in the area of religion despite the 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution which
Congress enacted as part of its plenary exclusive authority; and 2) Why is it that despite triple citizenship-tribal-federal-state--individual Indians still lack enforceable constitutional rights to practice their traditional
religions.

These are not easy questions to answer. For despite explicit legislative and citizenship recognition of
tribal religious rights, it is true as Riker and Weingast observe that "rights are not sufficient to guarantee
liberty. A guarantee at least requires, in addition, appropriate governmental structures, appropriate traditions of civility, and other related factors" (1988: 375). Unfortunately, because of the distinctive nature and
55

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Wed, 16 Oct 2019 17:32:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

basis of tribal rights, pre- and extra-constitutional in their origin, it is difficult to ascertain what kind of
"appropriate governmental structure" is available to protect tribal rights. As we noted in the beginning of this
paper, that is why the Congress is empowered with plenary exclusive authority to address the special needs
and collective rights of tribes--because tribal rights are protected neither by the Constitution nor the Bill of
Rights. And although "traditions of civility" are certainly relevant and have contributed to the protections of
Indians and minority rights on occasion, they have proven to be an unreliable and unenforceable basis on
which tribes could hope to have their rights shielded from governmental infringement.
._.... _._?__ _____ _ There are, we would argue, three14 plausible, interrelated and some-

...the Rehnquist Court has become an imperial times overlapping, reasons why the Rehnquist Court has become an imentity intent on crafting its own social policy, perial entity intent on crafting its own social policy in contradistinction to
what the Congress and the Bush administration is supporting for tribes: 1)
the alleged cultural and spiritual inferiority of indigenous cultures belief systems; 2) individualism-assimilation; and 3) federalism, Rehnquist style.
Cultural Inferiority: Petoskey (1985), Deloria (1989a), and Echohawk (1989) have argued that a principle

reason the justices are unwilling to recognize the religious rights of Indians is because tribal religious
experience and sentiment are not considered as entailing real religious expression and are therefore "not to
be taken seriously" (Deloria, 1989:12). It is also argued that tribes cannot expect justice because the federal
court jurists view tribal religious claims through Judeo-Christian values and therefore are unable or unwilling
to grasp the value of tribal views of the world which differ radically from those of western industrialized nations

(Petoskey, 1985: 221). 15

Individualism-Assimilation: Closely related to the first
who asserts that the Court seems to be resurrecting noti
those of the late nineteenth century Christian reformers.
that the destruction of tribal religions were essential bef
tion, and Civilization could evolve.
The modern court disavows the use of such blatantly eth
"barbarism," but their arguments, though couched in muc
similar. In short, the Court seems to be pushing the view
use of sacred plants like peyote are restricted or forbidd

individual Indians to abandon their aboriginal spiritua
individuals would then adopt traditional Judeo-Christ
Black issued a stinging dissent in Federal Power Comm

(1960), which typifies an opposite, more tolerant view of
ship to the land. It was, however, a minority judicial per
view today. In this case the Tuscarora Nation, which had t
of their reservation, lost their case before the supreme cou
for the construction of a hydroelectric power plant. Justi
land as violative of federal law, Indian policy, and as a "b

These Indians have a way of life which this Governmen

encourage. Cogent arguments can be made that it wou

were to abandon their old customs and habits, and

where they reside. The fact remains, however, that t
continued their tribal life with trust in a promise of

In a closing line, Black uttered one of the Court's most f
men, should keep their word" (Ibid.).
This second argument individualism-assimilation--is mor
It is plausible, we argue, because while the Court until rece
areas of religious tolerance and civil rights than earlier in
rights (especially those involving the criminally accused,
seem more intellectually and philosophically grounded in
This period emerged between the 1850s and the 1880s and
less interested in protecting civil liberties and individual
This historical era witnessed the development of an all
American bar, and Supreme Court justices who shared a p
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conflicts. These legal elites allied with science against what Kennedy called "the crudities of democratic
politics" (p. 4). Fundamental to Kennedy's arguments is the notion of "legal consciousness," which he says
must be recognized and confronted. This consciousness operates to distinguish the Court from other political

institutions. For Kennedy, legal consciousness has a "measure of autonomy." "It is," he argues, "a set of
concepts and intellectual operatives that evolves according to a pattern of its own, and exercises an influence
on results distinguishable from those of political power and economic interest" (p. 4).
The importance of this concept, for purposes of understanding the Court's Indian case law, are such that
an extended quotation is called for:
The autonomy of legal consciousness is a premise; yet that autonomy is no more than relative.
Not only the particular concepts and operations characteristic of a period, But also the entity that
they together constitute, are intelligible only in terms of the larger structures of social thought
and action.

This approach denies the importance neither of ideologies like laissez-faire, nor of concrete
economic interests, nor of the underlying structure of political power. It insists only that legal
consciousness, which has its own structure, mediates their influence on particular legal results...
(p.4) ...The notion behind the concept of legal consciousness is that people can have in common
something more influential than a checklist of facts, techniques, and opinions. They can share
premises about the salient aspects of the salient aspects of the legal order that are so basic that actors rarely if ever

bring them consciously to mind. Yet everyone, includin g actors who think they disagree profoundly about the substantive issues that matter, would dismiss without a second thought... an approach

appearing to deny them. These underlying premises concern the historical background of the
legal process, the institutions involved in it, and the nature of the intellectual constructs which
lawyers, judges, and commentators manipulate as they attempt to convince their audiences" (p.

6).
While consciousness, broadly put, refers to the essence of opinion, attitudes, goals, theories, emotions, and

sensibilities held by an individual or group, legal consciousness more particularly refers to that type of
consciousness that the legal profession as a social group holds at a given moment (p.23). Unlike basic
individual or group consciousness, however, legal consciousness is differentiated because of legal rules, ideals,
arguments, and legal theories operational at a given time.

Historical examples of Supreme Court decisions which evidence that body's unique consciousness on
Indian and tribal status, rights, and identity are legion.15 More importantly, in the last fifteen years both the
Burger and now the Rehnquist court's have adopted, for certain purposes, a political stance which clearly

evidences is own legal consciousness in a way that perpetuates a number of stereotypes and myths about
tribes and tribal-federal relations. For instance, the Court held in U.S. v. Wheeler that tribal sovereignty
existed "only at the sufferance of Congress" (435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)); in Oliphant v. Suquamish, the Court
stated that "upon incorporation into the territory of the U.S. the Indian
tribes thereby came under the territorial sovereignty of the U.S. and their ...in the last fifteen years both the Burger and now

exercise of se of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the the Rehnquist court's have adopted, for certain
interest of this overriding sovereignty" (435 U.S 191 (1978)); and in U.S. v. purposes, a political stance which clearly evidenSioux Nation it was determined that Congress had "paramount power over ces its own legal consciousness in a way that perthe property of the Indians" (448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980)). Neither of these petuates a number of stereotypes and mythese
three cases contain evidence of any form--historical, political, constitutional, or legal--which justifies the Court's expressions "sufferance," "overriding
sovereignty," or "paramount" congressional authority over tribes. These are legal fictions developed by the
court to satisfy its own political and social agenda (see, for example, Ball, 1987).
More pertinent to this article are the recent religious cases where the court has argued, for instance, that
notwithstanding the fact that logging and road building would have "devastating effects on traditional Indian
religious practices..." "the Constitution," said Justice O'Connor, "simply does not provide a principle that could
justify upholding respondents' [Indians'] legal claims" (Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Association, 485
U.S. 439,451-452 (1988)). Furthermore, in Employment Division v. Smith (108 Led. 876 (1990)), the majority
held that while "it would doubtless be unconstitutional" for example, "to ban the casting of statues that are to
be used for worship purposes, or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf' it was declared constitutional,
on the other hand, for a state to impose general prohibitions against the use of peyote, even though the law
infringed on the individual's practice of his religion. But Blackmun noted in a powerful dissent in Smith, that
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"if Oregon can constitutionally prosecute them [Indians] for this act of worship, they, like the Amish, may be
forced to migrate to some other more tolerant region...." ...This particularly devastating impact must be

viewed in light of the federal policy--reached in reaction to many years of religious persecution and
intolerance--of protecting the religious freedom of Native Americans" (pp. 912-913).
Ironically, in both Lyng and Smith the factual disputes prompting both cases has since been resolved in
a way that should have averted the litigation in the first place. For instance, the construction of the six-mile

stretch of road which was disputed in Lyng has been abandoned (Deloria, 1991b: 286); and in Oregon the
legislature has since enacted regulations that allows an "affirmative defense" for anyone using peyote "in
connection with the good faith practice of a religious belief, as directly associated with a religious practice,
and in a manner that is not dangerous to the health of the user or others who are in the proximity of the user"
(Oregon Revised Statutes, 1991, Vol. 8: 37-83, 37-84).

Two other cases should suffice as evidence indicating a unique "legal consciousness." In a 1991 case,
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Potawatomi, a unanimous court held that "Congress has always been at liberty
to dispense with such tribal [sovereign] immunity or to limit it" (51 CCH S.Ct.Bull. p. B932). Finally, in a
January 1992 case involving the Yakima nation, Justice Scalia, writing for a majority, uttered a statement which
typifies the regnant legal consciousness of the Rehnquist Court. Scalia noted that while "the Yakima Nation
argues that state jurisdiction over reservation fee land is manifestly inconsistent with the policies of Indian

self-determination and self-governance that lay behind the Indian Reorgani7ation Act and subsequent
congressional enactment this seems to us a great exaggeration" (Yakima v. County of Yakima and Dale Gray,

60 USLW 4067, 4071). Blackmun, the lone dissenter challenging the majority's powerful and apparently
entrenched consciousness, quoted from McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission (441 U.S. 164, 179
(1973)) where a unanimous court held that they were "far from convinced that when a State imposes taxes
upon reservation members without their consent, its actions can be reconciled with tribal self-determination."
In the Yakima case Blackmun could find no legitimate constitutional or statutory basis on which the Court
based its reversal of long-standing federal policy. In fact, the Bush administration filed an amicus brief in
support of the Yakima's contention that if the Congress had not explicitly authorized state taxation of fee
patented lands within a reservation then the state was precluded from acting to tax those lands.
The third factor that may help explain the court's Indian case law involving questions of religious freedom
centers on the doctrine of federalism, with the active participants being Congress, the federal courts, and the
states. While the interactions of these three entities can be troublesome enough, the introduction of tribes
which are non-federal entities, along with individual Indians, who because of triple citizenship must be viewed

through a different set of lenses, depending on the power source involved, makes this an extremely
problematic area.
There is abundant evidence, first of all, that as a partner in the ruling national alliance, the court will
usually support the federal government's position, particularly if there is a conflict between federal power

and tribal sovereignty (Dahl, 1957; McCulloch, 1991). This dimension is rarely disputed and has persisted
since Marshall's trilogy of cases in the early 1800s (Burke, 1969). But it is the Rehnquist court's orientation
towards state's rights that has generated major concern among tribes and individual Indians (Burton, 1991;

Lawson and Morris, 1991).
One could hypothesize, and there is good evidence to affirm, that the more deferential a Supreme Court
justice is to the traditional powers of state government, "the more likely he or she will be to vote in favor of
the States and against the Indians whenever a jurisdictional conflict between the two occurs" (Burton, 1991:
39). Furthermore, one could test the hypothesis that over the last two decades, which encompass both the
Burger and Rehnquist courts, that as the Court has leaned more towards a reassertion of states' rights it has
become less supportive of tribal rights. This second hypothesis has been tested and confirmed in the area of
water rights (Burton, 1991) and natural resource issues (Holland, 1989). And it has been implicitly confirmed,
though not necessarily systematically tested, in the area of free exercise of religion (see Deloria, 1989a, 1991a,
1991c, 1992; Gordon, 1991; Moore and DeCoteau, 1991; Brooks, 1990; Martin, 1990; Wyatt, 1989; and Barsh,
1986). Finally, there is also some evidence showing that the Supreme Court is extremely sensitive to instances
where tribal activities will have an adverse affect on non-Indian citizens and interests of the states, particularly
if the state lacks jurisdictional authority to regulate the tribal activity (Kramer, 1986: 991).
This issue is more complex, however. We can conceive of a large set of legal relationships in the United
States--i.e., private citizens to private citizens, private citizens to states, legislature to judiciary, federal to
state, tribal individual to tribal government, tribal individual to state government, tribal individual to federal

government, tribal government' to state, and tribal government to federal government. Each of these,
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including the first four sets of relationships which do not explicitly involve Indian actors, can have an effect

on tribal or individual rights.17 And the role of the states has certainly become more prominent under both
the Burger and Rehnquist courts. In fact, Rawlings posits that the Court has recently developed a trend of
"setting aside spheres in which it allows the government (both state and federal, depending on the issue) to
assert almost unchallenged authority in making laws that infringe on individuals' free exercise rights" (1991:

585-586).

Conclusion
We have spent considerable time and energy analyzing the relationship between tribes and individual
Indians and the Congress, on the one hand, and the relationship between tribes and individual Indians and

the U.S. Supreme Court. There is currently a yawning chasm dividing the way the federal government's
political branches, especially the Congress, and to a lesser, though still vital sense, the executive (though the
BIA is an uncooperative partner in the new process of self-governance) and the Supreme Court conceptualize
tribal political status, sovereignty, personal and collective property rights, and individual tribal members' civil
liberties. Historically, tribes received little support from the U.S. Congress on central issues of property,
self-governance, religious freedom, etc. And there is still nothing inherent in the political process, much less
in the constitutional structure to guarantee that the federal government's political branches will not engage
in infringements of the political or property rights of tribes or individual Indians. There is, however, at the
present a vital effort by the political branches, supported by a growing number of tribes, to resuscitate the
process of bilateral agreements which would restore some semblance of tribal autonomy to those tribes who

choose to participate.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has struck out on its own and has imperially stripped American
Indian individuals and tribes of their right to practice traditional religions and frequent sacred places if those
rights appear to clash with the property rights of federal agencies or state interests. Tribal individual and
indigenous governments, however, are not idly sitting by while the Court dismantles their religious (or other)
rights. Ably supported by concerned congressional representatives, various Christian denominations, Indian

and non-Indian lobbying and interest groups and pan-Indian organizations (i.e., Association on American
Indian Affairs, Native American Rights Fund, National Congress of American Indians, and various "Green"
groups) and even an occasional state government (i.e., California in the Lyng case), American Indians have

and are vigorously seeking legislative action to counter the negative effects of several Rehnquist Court
decisions. Tribes and their supporters have already been successful in securing enactment of a 1991
congressional law (105 St. 646) which overturned a major criminal law case, Duro v. Reina (58 USLW 4643
(1990)) which had effectively deprived tribal governments of their right to exercise misdemeanor criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
Legislation has already been introduced (See Table II) to rectify the serious constitutional problems the
Court's Indian religion cases have generated. Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D., New York), for instance,
introduced H.R. 2797, the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act," on June 27,1991 which, if enacted, would
reverse "the disastrous effects of a dastardly and unprovoked attack on our first freedom by the Supreme

Court of the United States." (Congressional Record, 1991:E2422). Reciting the essence of the Smith case
which eliminated the first amendment's requirement that government "accommodate the religious practices
of all Americans unless it can demonstrate that the burden imposed is the least restrictive means available to
achieve a compelling state interest," Solarz' bill seeks to prohibit the government from burdening a person's

free exercise of religion, "even if that burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it can
demonstrate that the governmental action is essential to further a compelling governmental interest and that
it is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest" (Ibid.).
Simultaneously, a broader based effort is underway by the aforementioned intertribal and intra-organizational alliance, with a core of traditional Indian people, in an effort to get redress by Congress. A new omnibus
religious freedom bill will be introduced sometime in 1992 which will not only address the court's recent
litigation, but will probably also encompass a new federal policy designed to provide real, that is to say, legally
enforceable, rights of action and some enforcement mechanism which the original 1978 resolution lacked.
There is hope that such legislation, in conjunction with Congress' own current political consciousness which

is geared towards a recognition of aboriginal rights, would act to protect American Indian religious rights

(Deloria, 1991c: 24; Boyles, 1991).
Even if these bills fail of enactment, there is still room for optimism, at least for tribal citizens. In his
most recent and one of his most provocative works on this emotionally-charged subject, "Trouble in High
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Places: Erosion of American Indian Rights to Religious Freedom in the United States" (1992), Deloria offers
a brilliant analysis of what he terms "the three major paths" that federal Indian law has and continues to
travel--the treaty relationship, the Trust Doctrine, and federal property ownership of public lands.
After critically assessing the advantages and pitfalls of each of these "possible theories" of the tribalfederal relationship, Deloria engages in a critical analysis of the Lyng case and shows 1) how a negotiated
settlement, formulated along the lines of the former treaty-agreement process could have been used to settle

this religious dispute without the need for litigation; 2) how the federal government's so-called "trust
responsibility" which should have operated to protect the sacred sites of the California tribes, was instead
completely negated by the O'Connor majority; and 3) how the property rights of the United States are defined
by the Court and pertinent federal agencies as if they [the property] "belongs to them [government employees]
personally, and that any effort by the public to participate in management is a personal affront" (1992: 287).
Deloria, however, ironically and astutely suggests that within a few years the Lyng case might actually be
recalled as a "positive landmark by Indian people," though O'Connor and her majority cohorts certainly did
not intend for this to result. Deloria says this is a distinct possibility and suggests that "Lyng may have been

a necessary step in replacing the Trust Doctrine with the treaty settlement process, thus reversing a
century-long trend of making the treaty rights a function of the willingness of the federal entity to fulfill its

promises" (p. 286). We should all, Indian and non-Indian alike, hope he is right.

Notes
1. The Bush Administration on June 14,1991 issued its position reaffirming the political relationship between tribes and the U.S.
Bush asserted that his administration was intent on "fostering tribal self-government and self-determination" (Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, Vol. 27, No. 25: 783-784).

2. Tribes qua Tribes are not citizens and remain extra-constitutional entities not subject to either the U.S. Constitution's

constraints or eligible for its protections.
3. Tribal nations are sovereign since they were not created pursuant to the federal constitution. Thus, the Bill of Rights does not
apply to the acts of tribal governments and limits on state and federal power delineated in the federal constitution cannot constrain
tribal governing powers. Tribes, for instance, may legally discriminate against non-tribal and non-member Indians in voting solely on

the basis of race (Indian Civil Rights Act, 82 St. 77); the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by grand jury doe snot apply to
prosecutions in tribal courts (Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)); and as separate sovereigns tribes enjoy sovereign immunity (Santa

Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,56 (1978)).
4. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
5. Vine Deloria, Jr. has forcefully made this argument on several occasions. But see Felix Cohen (1972 ed.: 91) who asserts with
minimal proof that the Congress' power over tribes, in addition to the treaty-making power, gives the Congress "much broader" power

over the tribes than over commerce "between states." On the previous page Cohen more accurately noted that "Congress has no
constitutional power over Indians except what is conferred by the Commerce Clause and other clauses of the Constitution."
6. Washington State's Constitution, Art. XXVI, Second, contains an example of one such disclaimer: "That the people inhabiting
this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lyingwithin the boundaries
of this state, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States...."
7. In the period when unlimited congressional power was first sanctioned, U.S. v. Kagama (1886), to the time when the Supreme
Court first said there might be some limits to such authority, U.S. v. Perrin (1914), plenary power was explicitly cited by the Supreme

Court in nearly a dozen cases, beginning with Stephens v. Cherokee Nation (1899) and ending with Sizemore v. Brady (1914). As
recently as 1991, the Supreme Court asserted that "Congress has plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs" (Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 57 USLW 4445 (1989): 27). The best analytical study of plenary power remains Nell Jessup Newton's

excellent article "Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitation" University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132
(1984):195-288.
8. I must reiterate my view that while Congress has generally been supportive of tribal self-determination it is still the case that
a fundamental asymmetry exists between the U.S. and the tribes. These larger structural and philosophical issues, including Congress'

self-arrogated assumption of a superior political position over tribes, have been treated admirably by others. See Milner Ball's excellent
article, "Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes," American Bar Foundation Research JournaL 1 (1987): 1-139; and Nell Jessup Newton's
piece, "Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations." University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 132 (1984): 195-288;
for good samples of such work.
9. See, for example, Richard Nixon's Indian Policy in 1970; the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971; the Indian Education
Act of 1972; Menominee Restoration in 1973; Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act in 1975; the American Indian

Policy Review Commission, established in 1975, etc. Consult Francis P. Prucha's Documents of United States Indian Policy, 2nd
edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990) which contains nearly all the major policies for this and prior years.
10. Numerous studies have shown that the Indian Self-Determination Policy had serious structural, economic, and philosophical
problems that effectively precluded it from actually encouraging genuine tribal autonomy (Gross, 1978; Champagne, 1983; Nelson and
Sheley, 1985; and Stuart, 1990).
11. The original tribes were: Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, Hoopa Tribe, Jamestown Band of S'Klallam, Lummi Indian
Tribe, Mescalero Apache Tribe, Mille Lacs Chippewa Tribe, Quinault Indian Nation, Red Lake Chippewa Tribe, Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
and Tlingit and Haida Central Council.
12. In fact, a number of scholars have argued that, all things being equal, the Supreme Court has acted more often as a legitimator
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of the activities emanating from the political branches (Barsh and Henderson, 1980; Newton, 1984: 234; Kramer, 1986; Ball, 1987; Riker
and Weingast, 1988; and Williams, 1990). The Court's usual deference to Congress is best evidenced by the persistence of the political
question doctrine in the field of foreign affairs and the fact that the Courts have never declared an act af Congress unconstitutional
with regards to the United States right to diminish tribal sovereignty or aboriginal rights (Coulter, 1978: 35). While the political question
doctrine has been repudiated by the Court (Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) and U.S. v. Sioux Nation
of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980)) in the area of Indian law, the judicial arm still generally defers to congressional decisions regarding
federal power over tribal property and tribal sovereignty (Newton, 1984: 235). As a federal court of appeals said in Buster v. Wright,
(135 Fed. 947 (1905) appeal dismissed by Supreme Court 203 U.S. 599 (1906)), "the opinion of the legislative and executive departments
of the government... while not controlling upon the court's are entitled to great deference and grave consideration" (p.954-955). This
judicial deference has often compromised the rights of Indians as well as other minorities (Riker and Weingast, 1988: 399).
There is also ample evidence in which the Courts acted as initiators of policywhen it was determined that Congress was not acting
fast enough. See, for example, Washington v. Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) where the court fashioned a pragmatic
set of rules which set the future pattern for enforcement of treaty rights in migratory fish in the Northwest coast: including reaffirmation
of the major rule that it was logical to establish a 50% share of the harvestable run as the "ceiling" for the Indian fishery.

13. Thanks to Mr. Rudolph Coronado, Jr. for this term.
14. I welcome comments, ideas, and suggestions from readers who might wish to add or explicate this list.
15. I owe a special debt to Dr. Tom Holm who through numerous conversations with me over the past two years has convinced
me that the Rehnquist Court is actively engaging in an effort to revisit the spirit of the late 1800s, which persisted into the early twentieth

century, when the dominant issues considered by the Court centered on economic regulations, the sanctity of private property, and
legitimating the rise of corporate power. We have already described how federal policies of the era were designed to assimilate and
acculturate Indians into mainstream America.

16. Racism, ethnocentrism, and the perceived "superiority" of western institutions and values are vividly displayed in a myriad of

Supreme Court cases. See, for example, U.S. v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45 (1913) which referred to Indians as 'degraded;" and U.S. v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 which said Indians were "wards." See Nancy Carol Carter's "Race and Power Politics as Aspects of Federal
Guardianship Over American Indians: Land-Related Cases, 1887-1924, American Indian Law Review, 4 (1976): 197-248.
17. In my dissertation, which was an analysis of the major Supreme Court cases from 1870 to 1921 (90 in all), the data revealed
that in nearly one-half of the cases, 43 in all, there was no tribal or individual Indian represented as a direct party to the case. In other
words, in nearly 40% of the cases while an issue or subject matter of importance to Indians was being litigated, there was no direct

Indian or tribal involvement. This is a startling figure and indicates an absurd reality. It is a reality which entails the realization by
tribal people, frequently after the fact, that their civil and political rights, as well as their property rights, may be diminished or enlarged

without the benefit of any Indian involvement (Wilkins, 1990: 76).
The classic example of this type of case with no Indian involvement is Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). While
this case has been hailed by many as the preeminent tribal sovereignty case, in fact, tribes were not involved. The active parties were
several anglo missionaries and the State of Georgia.
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